Metsfanmax wrote:RE: the first part, what mrswdk said (still begging the question). Furthermore, we're still gonna hit the axiom based on preference. You want to equate all "sentient enough" animals to humans, while I don't. Basically, this is what will happen: we can argue about the definition of a person in order to support our contrary axioms. You'd expand it, while I'd constrict it--while both of us would be basing our claims on essentially arbitrary reasons (i.e. by preference)). It's an unresolvable moral debate.
As I have said, this is not a question of me wanting to
expand your definition. My point is that you already have a definition that is expanded enough that it logically ought to include many non-human animals*, you just aren't following what your own definition directs you to do. It is the internal inconsistency in your system that I am mainly pointing out, not my own beliefs. My challenge to you is to state clearly why you believe that killing a human is wrong, and then state clearly why those reasons don't also apply to animals that are not humans. What is it in your definition of murder that calls for a demarcation on a category boundary as arbitrary as species? And how would you argue with someone who makes an equally arbitrary demarcation based on race or sex?
This is interesting because I haven't offered a definition. Why? I already explained the problems of the "changing semantics" game.
That segment of our discussion is about the meta problem with this debate. We can use logic in order to justify emotionally preconceived positions. We can keep playing the "changing definition" game to confirm our contrary stances. E.g. I'd drop "marginal sentience" (whatever that exactly means) and find some other term For example, you're now claiming that sentience no longer matters, but intelligence does. This frames me into making arguments about killing human veggies--if I accept the change in your definition. I can still insist that sentience matters; or potential sentience matters, blah blah blah. It's a tactic that won't resolve the issue in a least-cost manner, so I'm going to avoid it. You're welcome to join me.
When is killing a human wrong? It depends on the context (the legitimate institutions, the costs, the benefits, constraints etc.). (For two examples of changes in scarcity/constraints and how that affects the legitimacy of killing humans, see
this).
When is killing a non-human wrong? Again, it depends on the context (the legitimate institutions, the costs, the benefits, constraints etc.). For example see
this, first paragraph.
I'll explain below.
RE: Cats v. Chickens, it depends on the reasons of consumption. Chicken usually is consumed over a short period of time for its nutritional value and deliciousness, while cats are consumed over a longer time for their cuteness, comfort, and so on. Cats are consumer durables; chickens are not. However, sometimes cats can be consumed as food, and sometimes chickens are kept as pets (or rather only for producing eggs). The morally relevant difference depends on the goal of consuming the particular animal. There's no one-size-fits-all goal for each animal here.
Yes, and I am asking you to make an apples-to-apples comparison by comparing eating a cat to eating a chicken.[/quote]
How many times do I have to say this? It'll keep depending on context. Is the chicken a pet? Or is it food? What are the reasons for eating a pet? Is the situation dire? Or is it not? What are the alternative means of consumption and production and how do they compare to the current means of consumption and production?
The moral difference depends on the means, the goals, the good itself, and the relative costs.
Animal cruelty laws are arbitrary. As a matter of pure logic, I wouldn't appeal to any laws in this debate, but as a matter of emotion and preference, I'd favor certain laws that protect certain animals from certain activities in particular places (e.g. no dog fighting). But, I can cover up that emotional stance with logic--e.g. dogs capable of fighting would still live around the neighborhood. They've been bred into aggressiveness and could hurt someone or someone's pets, so to stop this negative externality, prohibit the practice of dog fighting. etc.).
You could cover up that emotional stance with logic. If you think that is an intellectually proper thing to do, that is you think the only real reason to have a law against dogfighting is that a human might get hurt, so be it. But note that I wasn't appealing to the laws to prove that my stance is right, I was doing it to prove that our system of morals is indeed arbitrary, as you recognize. The laws are just a reflection of the fact that people are legitimately outraged by torturing or neglecting cats and dogs, but pay no heed to worse things happening in the preparation of their dinner.[/quote]
Right, because...
(1) Consent matters. Property rights matter. To avoid racially/gender-based justifications, people have property rights over themselves. In order to use a person as your property, you need their consent. Seems pretty straight-forward, so out goes the racial/gender problem. Non-humans are essentially objects which people own. Not all non-humans are owned (it depends on the relative costs of applying various kinds of property rights regime for a given set of non-humans--e.g. a commons, or fish in the bottom of the Mariana trench, etc.).
What about people with zero intelligence? e.g. human veggies? There's some informal or formal agreement about "cutting the plug," so regardless of the intelligence/sentience criteria, killing humans can be legitimate. The Inuit starvation example is another context-dependent determination of legitimately killing humans.
These cases that involve humans depend on consent. Are non-humans capable of giving consent? If so, then how do humans control for their own anthropomorphic personification of animals?